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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
Constitutional
TION-RIGHTS

Law-FOURTEENTH
OF THE UNWED

AMENDMENT EQUAL PROTECFATHER-CONSENT TO ADOPTION

In re Malpica-Orsini, 36 N.Y.2d 568, 331 N.E.2d 486,
370 N.Y.S.2d 511 (1975)
Until recently, the putative father1 was generally ignored in
adoption proceedings involving his illegitimate children. 2 Although
consent to an adoption was normally required from the unwed
mother, and from both parents of a legitimate child, 3 most states
did not even require that the unmarried father be given notice of a
pending adoption.4 The law presumed that he was an irresponsible
1 The term "putative father" will be used in this Note to refer to the natural father of
an illegitimate child. The term, as used here, is not intended to convey any derogatory
implication.
' The right to adoption of children, while known to the ancient Greeks and Romans,
and recognized by different continental nations under the civil law, was unknown at
common law and exists only by statute in the United States. In re Malpica-Orsini, 36 N.Y.2d
568, 570, 331 N.E.2d 486, 487, 370 N.Y.S.2d 511, 513 (1975).
The main impediment to development of adoption at common law was the feudal
tradition that rights and property could pass only to biological children born during
wedlock. An illegitimate child, or one who otherwise became part of a family, would never
be considered an heir. S. & E. KLIBANOFF, LET's TALK ABOUT ADOPTION 181 (1973).
' See, e.g., Comment, The Emerging ConstitutionalProtection of the Putative Father'sParental
Rights, 70 MiCH. L. REv. 1581, 1583-84 (1972).
" Id. at 1584 n.20. As of 1973, only 12 states made some provision for the putative
father's consent through statutes or case law: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado,
Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, Rhode Island, South Dakota, and Utah.
Comment, Protecting the Putative Father's Rights After Stanley v. Illinois: Problems in
Implementation, 13 J. FAM. L. 115, 138-39 (1973).
As of December 1, 1975, the following statutes generally required consent to an
adoption from all locatable putative fathers: ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 4, §9 9.1-7, -8, -12a
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1975); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 61-205, -302 to -305, -325 (Interim
Supp. 1975); ch. 640, [1975] Oregon Laws 123 (pamph. 8); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §§ 15-7-2,
-5, -6, -9 (Supp. 1975); ch. 274 [1975] Pub. Laws of R.I. 727-28; VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-225
(Supp. 1975); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 26.32.030, .040, .080, .085 (Supp. 1974); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 48.84 (Supp. 1975).
As of December 1, 1975, the following statutes required the putative father's consent to
an adoption under certain conditions (e.g., acknowledgement or adjudication of paternity,
support): ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 3 (1958); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-106, -111 (1974); ARK.
STAT. ANN. §§ 56-104, -106 (1971); ch. 1244, §§ 7, 11 [1975] West's Cal. Legis. Serv. 3439-40,
3443-44; COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-1-103(21), -4-107 (1973); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13,
§§ 901, 906-08, 1101, 1105-07 (1974 & Supp. 1974); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-304, -306
(1973); ch., 75-226 [1975] West's Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 598-600; IND. CODE § 31-3-1-6 (Burns
Supp. 1975); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 600.3, .4 (1950 & Supp. 1975); Ky. REV. STAT.- ANN.
§§ 199.480, .500,_.605 (Baldwin Supp. 1974); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 532C532e
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person, who had no concern for the welfare of the children he had
fathered.5
A major change in this state of affairs began in 1972 with the
Supreme Court's decision in Stanley v. Illinois,6 a case that involved
a putative father whose illegitimate children were declared wards of
the state upon the death of their unwed mother, even though the
(Supp. 1975); MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 27.3178(555.28)-(555.43) (1975 Current Material Release
#1); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 259.24, .26, .261 (Supp. 1975); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 43-104, -104.02
to -.06 (Supp. 1975); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 127.040, .090, .140 (1973); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 170-B:5, -B:13 (Supp. 1975); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-2-21(H), -23, -25, -30 (Supp. 1975);
ch. 48 [1975]N.C. Legis. Serv. 191; S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 25-6-1.1, -4, -17 (1967 &
Supp. 1975); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-4 (Supp. 1975).
As of December 1, 1975, the putative father's consent to an adoption was generally not
required under the following statutes: ALASKA STAT. §§ 20.15.40, .100 (Cum. Supp. 1975);
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 74-403, -408 (1973); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 578 -2 (Supp. 1974); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 59-2102 (Supp. 1974); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:421-422.1, 9:425-29 (West 1965);
MD. ANN. CODE. art. 16, § 74 (1973); MD. RULES OF PROCEDURE D73, D74 (Supp. 1975);
MASS. ANN. LAWs ch. 210, §§ 2-4 (Supp. 1974); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-17-5 (1972); Mo. ANN.
STAT. §§ 453.030, .040, .060 (Vernon Supp. 1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:2-13(0, 9:2-16 to
-19, 9:3-18(f), -19, -19.1, -23 (1960); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111 (McKinney Supp. 1975);
N.D. CiNT. CODE §§ 14-15-05, -06, -li (1971); ch. 128 [1975] Laws of N.D. 458; ch. 130,
§ 23, 24 [1975] Laws of N.D. 461; OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3107.04, .06 (1972); ORLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 60.5 (Supp. 1975); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, §§ 411, 421 (Supp. 1975); P.R.
LAWs ANN. tit. 31, § 536, tit. 32, §§ 2691, 2693, 2696 (1968); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 10-2587.6,
.7, .12 (Supp. 1974); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. 33 11.01, 16.03, .05 (1975); ch. 476 § 11.09
[1975] Vernon's Texas Sess. Law Serv. 1257; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 435, 441 (Supp.
1975); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-4-1 (Supp. 1975); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-709, -710.1 (Supp.
1975).
Some statutes have been excluded from the above lists because of ambiguity in their
consent provisions. For a discussion of recent changes in state adoption consent statutes, see
notes 86-101 and accompanying text infra.
5 1973/74 ANNUAL SURVEY OF AM. L. 249 (1974), citing Tabler, PaternalRights in the
Illegitimate Child: Some Legitimate Complaints on Behalf of the Unwed Father, 11 J. FAM. L. 231
(1971).
The putative father has always been somewhat of an outcast in American society. Even
social workers considered him a shadowy figure, not of great importance in the mother's
problems. Dukette & Stevenson, The Legal Rights of Unmarried Fathers, 47 SOCIAL SERVICE
REV. 1, 9 (1973). "In general, a social attitude of censure, but also of permissiveness, was
common. Only gradually is more realistic information being gathered." Ild.
The traditional view that the putative father is normally not interested in the welfare of
his illegitimate children is apparently shared by Chief Justice Burger:
[I] believe ... that ... on the basis of common human experience. .. the biological
role of the mother in carrying and nursing an infant creates stronger bonds
between her and the child than the bonds resulting from the male's often casual
encounter. This view is reinforced by the observable fact that most unwed mothers
exhibit a concern for their offspring either permanently or at least until they are
safely placed for adoption, while unwed fathers rarely burden either the mother or
the child with their attentions or loyalties. Centuries of human experience buttress
this view of the realities of human conditions and suggest that unwed mothers of
illegitimate children are generally more ilependable protectors of their children
than are unwed fathers.
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 665-66 (1972) (dissenting opinion).
6 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
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father had custody of the children at the time.7 Under the Illinois
Juvenile Court Act 8 the state took custody of illegitimate children
upon the death of their natural mother, without regard to the
actual fitness of the natural father. All parents except unwed
fathers were entitled to fitness hearings when the custody of their
children was at stake. 9 The Court struck down the statutory
procedure, holding that as a matter of due process the father was
entitled to such a hearing before his children were taken from him,
and that by denying him a hearing and extending it to all other
parents the state denied him equal protection of the laws.' 0
While Stanley dealt with a custody proceeding," the Court
7 The father, Peter Stanley, had lived with the mother intermittently for eighteen years,
during which time they had three children. Id. at 646. He was living with and supporting two
of the children at the time they were declared wards of the state. Id. at 650 nA.
8 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 701-1 to 708-4 (Smith-Hurd 1972).
9 The distinction was derived from the language of ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 701-14
(Smith-Hurd 1972), which defined "parents" as "the father and mother of a legitimate child,
or the survivor of them, or the natural mother of an illegitimate child, and ... any adoptive
parent." As a result of Stanley, § 701-14 was amended in 1973 to read: "'Parent' means the
father or mother of a legitimate child, or illegitimate child, and includes any adoptive
parent. It does not include a parent whose rights in any way have been terminated in any
manner provided by law." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 701-14 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974).
10 We have concluded that all Illinois parents are constitutionally entitled to a
hearing on their fitness before their children are removed frbm their custody. It
follows that denying such a hearing to Stanley and those like him while granting it
to other Illinois parents is inescapably contrary to the Equal Protection Clause.

405 U.S. at 658.
Thus, the Stanley Court found that denial of a due process right could also constitute a
violation of equal protection, where due process was denied only to certain persons. The
Court used a similar line of reasoning in holding that miscegenation statutes violated both
the equal protection and due process clauses. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
Chief Justice Burger believed that the majority's use of this analysis was improper:
This "method of analysis" is, of course, no more or less than the use of the Equal
Protection Clause as a shorthand condensation of the entire Constitution: a State
may not deny any constitutional right to some of its citizens without violating the
Equal Protection Clause through its failure to deny such rights to all of its citizens.
The limits on this Court's jurisdiction are not properly expandable by the use of
such semantic devices as that.
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. at 660 (dissenting opinion).
The dissent was especially critical of the use of a due process analysis, when no due
process issue had been raised in the state courts. Id. at 659. The majority maintained that it
could employ a due process analysis, since it was "a method of analysis readily available to
the state court." Id. at 658 n.10.
The language of Stanley is somewhat unclear as to whether the rights of putative
fathers who do not have custody of their children are to be protected. At one point the
Court stated that "all Illinois parents are constitutionally entitled to a hearing on their finess
before their children are removed from their custody." 405 U.S. at 658 (emphasis added). At
another point, however, the Court employed more general language: "We note in passing.
that the incremental cost of offering unwedfathers an opportunity for individualized hearings
on fitness appears to be minimal." Id. at 657 n.9 (emphasis added). This ambiguity has
probably been eliminated by the remand of two subsequent cases. See note 12 infra.
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subsequently remanded an adoption case for reconsideration "in
light of Stanley."'" Stanley has since been read as requiring, at a
minimum, notice and hearing for the putative father with custody
of his illegitimate children, in all proceedings affecting the legal
status of the children.' 3 Several state courts14 and at least one
federal court of appeals' 5 have invalidated (on the basis of Stanley)
12 Rothstein v. Lutheran Soc. Servs., 405" U.S. 1051 (1972).
Rothstein involved the adoption of an illegitimate child in Wisconsin one week'after
birth. As in Stanley, the Wisconsin law did not include unwed fathers within the definition of
"parent," and thus the father's consent was not required for the adoption. The father
petitioned the court for a writ of habeas corpus to determine legal custody of the child. The
state court held that the putative father had no parental rights, and that the failure of the
Wisconsin statutes to grant parental rights or notice of a hearing to a putative father was not
in violation of the Constitution. State ex tel. Lewis v. Lutheran Soc. Serv., 47 Wis. 2d 420, 178
N.W.2d 56 (1970), vacated sub nom. Rothstein v. Lutheran Soc. Serv., 405 U.S. 1051 (1972).
The Court also remanded "in light of Stanley" the case of Vanderlaan v. Vanderlaan,
405 U.S. 1051 (1972), which involved a dispute between divorced parents over custody of
two children born following the divorce decree. An Illinois court awarded custody to the
father five years after the divorce. Upon petition by the mother to regain custody, the
Illinois Supreme Court held (prior to remand) that the policy behind the Illinois Paternity
Act was that" 'a putative father should have no right to the society' of his children born out
of wedlock." Vanderlaan v. Vanderlaan, 126 Ill! App. 2d 410, 415, 262 N.E.2d 717, 720
(1970), vacated, 405 U.S. 1051 (1972), quoting DePhillips v. DePhillips, 35 Ill.
2d 154, 157,
219 N.E.2d 465, 467 (1966).
Because the father did not have custody of the children in Rothstein or Vanderlaan at the
time of the proceedings, the remand of the cases strongly suggests that the Supreme Court
did not intend to limit the impact of Stanley to custody cases.
13 See In re Anonymous, 78 Misc. 2d 1037, 359 N.Y.S.2d 220 (Surr. Ct. of Erie Co.
1974); Doe v. Department of Soc. Servs., 71 Misc. 2d 666,337 N.Y.S.2d 102 (Sup. Ct. 1972);In
re Guardianship of Harp, 6 Wash. App. 701,495 P.2d 1059 (1972); Slawek v. Stroh, 62 Wis. 2d
295, 215 N.W.2d 9 (1974); State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Soc. Servs., 59 Wis. 2d 1, 207
N.W.2d 826 (1973) (on remand). Cf People ex rel. Slawek v. Covenant Children's Home, 52
Ill. 2d 20, 284 N.E.2d 291 (1972); Vanderlaan v. Vanderlaan, 9 111. App. 3d 260, 292 N.E.2d
145 (1972) (on remand).
In Doe, the court interpreted Stanley as requiring notice and a hearing for a putative
father (concerning a prospective adoption) where the family court had adjudicated his
paternity and he had contributed to the support of the child.
In Slawek, the court apparently read Stanley to require that all putative fathers be given
the same notice and right to be heard as any parent in proceedings which affect their
children. 62 Wis. 2d at 303-04, 215 N.W.2d at 14-15. For an analysis of the Slawek decision,
see 58 MARQ. L. REv. 175 (1975).
14 See, e.g., People ex rel. Slawek v. Covenant Children's Home, 52 Ill. 2d 20, 284 N.E.2d
291 (1972) (striking down law precluding father of an illegitimate from asserting rights in
adoption proceeding); In re Guardianship of Harp, 6 Wash. App. 701,495 P.2d 1059 (1972)
(noting unconstitutionality of statute that denied notice of adoption to putative father); State
ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Soc. Servs., 59 Wis. 2d 1, 207 N.W.2d 826 (1973) (invalidating
statute requiring only mother's consent and no notice to father when parental rights are
being terminated).
In at least one case, the court simply reinterpreted the state adoption statute so as to
comply with Stanley, rather than declare the statute unconstitutional. Doe v. Department of
Social Servs., 71 Misc. 2d 666, 337 N.Y.S.2d 102 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
"s Miller v. Miller, 504 F.2d 106 (9th Cir. 1974). The case involved the adoption of an

316
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state adoption laws that discriminated against the putative father in
various ways. In addition, many states have taken steps to change
their adoption statutes so as to provide for the rights of the
16
putative father.
There is still considerable doubt, however, about the extent to
which Stanley mandates protection of the putative father's rights.
Some courts have interpreted the case to require only procedural
due process for unwed fathers during adoption proceedings, and
then only if the father has acknowledged his paternity in some
way. 17 Other courts have read Stanley to require more equal
treatment of the putative father, including his consent to an
adoption in most cases18 Although most authorities agree that the
best interests of the illegitimate child are of paramount importance,
there is disagreement over whether additional safeguards for the
father's rights necessarily detract from the child's welfare. 9
illegitimate child in Oregon, who was in the custody of his mother at the time. The mother
and father had shared custody of the child for a brief period, but the mother consented to
the adoption without consulting or attempting to secure the cooperation or consent of the
father. The father sued in a United States district court (jurisdiction based on 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (1970) and 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970)), attacking the constitutionality of the Oregon adoption
statute, which provided that for most adoptions of illegitimate children, "the father of the child
shall be disregarded just as if he were dead .... " ORE. REV. STAT. § 109.326(1) (1973). The
United States Court ofAppeals for the Ninth Circuit, without elaborating its reasoning, struck
down the statute as unconstitutional in light of Stanley. The Solicitor General of the State of
Oregon had conceded, in effect, that the statute was unconstitutional 504 F.2d at 1068.
i6 See, e.g., Co Lo. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-1-103(21), 19-4-107 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT.
REv. §§ 45-61 to -63 (1975); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 4, §§ 9.1-8 to -13 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1975);
MicH. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178 (555,28)-(555.43) (1975 Current Material Release #1); VA.
CODE ANN. § 63.1-225 (Supp. 1974); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.32.030 (Supp. 1974); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 48.84 (Supp. 1975); ch. 1244, §§ 7, 11 [1975] West's Cal. Legis. Serv. 3439-40,
3443-44; ch. 640, [1975] Oregon Laws 123 (pamph. 8).
In Missouri, caseworkers are now required to notify the putative father of a planned
adoption and to obtain a release if possible. This change from past practice (under which the
father was generally ignored) was instituted by new administrative provisions rather than by
statutory revision. 39 Mo. L. REv. 573, 574 n.14 (1974).
1' See, e.g., Department of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Herzog, 317 So. 2d 865 (lla. CL
App. 1975) (holding that father of illegitimate child has no right to notice and hearing unless
he has given tangible indication of interest in the child); Doe v. Department of Soc. Servs., 71
Misc. 2d 666, 537 N.Y.S.2d 102 (Sup. Ct. 1972). See also In re Morgan, 70 Misc. 2d 1063, 335
N.Y.S.2d 226 (Surr. Ct. of Erie Co. 1972) (putative father denied guardianship of children
because of his "attitude" and "lifestyle"); In re Connolly, 43 Ohio App. 2d 38,332 N.E.2d 376
(1974) (holding that mother of an illegitimate child has a legal right to the custody, care, and
control of the child superior to that of the natural father).
is See People ex rel. Slawek v. Covenant Children's Home, 52 Ill. 2d 20, 284 N.E.2d 291
(1972). See also Miller v. Miller, 504 F.2d 1067 (9th Cir. 1974); Catholic Charities of Dubuque
v. Zalesky, 232 N.W.2d 539 (Iowa Sup. Ct. 1975) (holding that notice required to all known
putative fathers and consent required from fathers who have cared for the child).
19 See generally Schwartz, Rights of a Father with Regard to His Illegitimate Child, 36 Omo"
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I
In re MALPICA-ORSINI

The New York Court of Appeals recently added its views to
2 0 The case involved
the post-Stanley debate in In re Malpica-Orsini.
the 1973 adoption of Heather Alison Malpica-Orsini, who was born
out of wedlock to Corrine Caberti in November 1970.21 The father,
appellant Hector Orsini, lived with the child and her mother until
June 1972. In September 1972, in a proceeding in which the
appellant admitted paternity, an order was entered in family court
adjudging appellant to be the father of the child and,'pursuant to
agreement, directing him to pay a monthly sum for support and
22
granting. him visitation rights.
Corrine Caberti subsequently married the respondent, Charles
Blasi, who then filed a petition for the adoption of Heather. Hector
Orsini then moved for an order enforcing his visitation rights,
granting him notice and an opportunity to be heard in all proceedings concerning his daughter, and dismissing the petition for
adoption. 23 Although the family court did order that appellant be
granted notice and an opportunity to be heard in all proceedings
concerning his daughter, 2 4 it subsequently approved the proposed
adoption following a hearing at which the appellant appeared. The
appellant appealed the decision directly to the New York Court of
Appeals 25 and, citing the Stanley case, contended that subdivision 3
STATE L.J. 1 (1975); Comment, supra note 3; 39 Mo. L. REV. 573 (1974); 36 MoNT. L. REv.
137 (1975).
20 36 N.Y.2d 568, 331 N.E.2d 486, 370 N.Y.S.2d 511 (1975). The case was appealed to
the Supreme Court but was dismissed for want of a substantial federal question. Orsini v.
Blasi, No. 75-5206 (Sup. Ct., dismissed Jan. 12, 1976).
21 Id at 569, 331 N.E.2d at 487, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 513.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 New York law makes no provision for notice to putative fathers in proceedings
involving their illegitimate children. Under § 111 of the New York Domestic Relations Law,
provision of notice to a putative father (or any parent) rests entirely in the discretion of the
judge or surrogate. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111 (McKinney Supp. 1975). In Doe v.
Department of Soc. Serv., 71 Misc. 2d 666, 337 N.Y.S.2d 102 (Sup. Ct. 1972), the court
therefore found it necessary, in light of Stanley, to read into the New York statute a
requirement for notice to putative fathers who acknowledged paternity. Id. at 671, 337
N.Y.S.2d at 107.
25 Under New York law, appeals may be taken directly to the court of appeals from a
final judgment of any court of record of original instance, where the only question involved
is the constitutionality of a statute. N.Y. CONsT. art. VI, § 3(b)(2) (McKinney 1969); N.Y. Civ.
PRAc. LAW § 5601(b)(2) (McKinney 1963).
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of section 111 of the New York Domestic Relations Law26 was

violative of the due process and equal protection clauses of the
United States Constitution, in that the New York state law improperly required consent to the adoption of a child from all natural
parents except the father of an illegitimate.
In a five-to-two decision, on the basis of a narrow construction
of Stanley, the court of appeals rejected Orsini's constitutional
claims. In so ruling, Judge Cooke, for the majority, held that under
two different tests section 111 complied with the requirements of
the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause. The court
first applied the "traditional" equal protection test, which requires
that a classification be "reasonable, not arbitrary, and have a fair
and substantial relation to the object of the legislation. ' 27 Noting
that a major purpose of adoption laws was to promote the welfare
of the child,2 8 the court maintained that requiring paternal consent
26

Section 111 provides, in pertinent part:

Subject to the limitations hereinafter set forth consent to adoption shall be
required as follows:
1. Of the adoptive child, if over fourteen years of age, unless the judge or
surrogate in his discretion dispenses with such consent;
2. Of the parents or surviving parent, whether adult or infant, of a child born
in wedlock;
3. Of the mother, whether adult or infant, of a child born out of wedlock;
4. Of any person or authorized agency having lawful custody of the adoptive
child.
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111 (McKinney Supp. 1975).
The statute also lists a number of circumstances under which the consent of a parent is
not required: e.g., where the parent is insane, incompetent, or habitually drunk; where the
parent had been judicially deprived of custody on account of cruelty or neglect; and where
the parent has abandoned his child. Id.
Section 111 lists the general consent requirements for all adoptions, whether by private
placement or through an authorized agency. In addition, the New York Social Services Law
contains a special provision for the surrender of destitute or dependent children to an
authorized agency for adoption. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384 (McKinney 1966), as amended,
(McKinney Supp. 1975). As under § 111 of the Domestic Relations Law, § 384 of the Social
Services Law requires only the mother of an illegitimate child to consent to a surrender,
while both parents are required to consent to the surrender of a legitimate child. Id.
27 36 N.Y.2d at 571, 331 N.E.2d at 488, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 515. See also Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 519-20 (1970); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78
(1911). The test is sometimes referred to as the "rational relation" analysis. See notes 44-46
and accompanying text infra.
28 The purpose of adoption laws has not always been to provide for the best interests of
the child:
The early laws and judicial interpretations of them show no consistent philosophy
and are a far cry from the moder notion that the purpose of adoption is to serve
the best interests of the child. A commonly held view was that adopted children
were "the waifs of society, foundlings or children whose parents are depraved and
worthless."... Children who needed to be adopted were considered inferior. The
result was court decisions on the rights of adopted children which favored biological
relationships over those formed through adoption.
S. & E. KLIBANOFF, supra note 2, at 184-85.
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for the adoption of an illegitimate child would hinder the adoption
process, thus "denying homes to the homeless . . . depriving
innocent children of the... blessings of adoption," and continuing
29
the visitations of the "out-of-wedlock stigma" on the child.
Because the statute removed a potential obstacle to adoption, the
court reasoned, it bore a fair and substantial relationship to the
welfare of the child.
The second equal protection test applied by the majority
involved the "dual inquiry," or "balancing test," suggested by the
Supreme Court in Weber v. Aetna Casuality & Surety Co.: 30 "What
legitimate state interest does the classification promote? What
31
fundamental personal rights might the classification endanger?"
Focusing on the legitimate state interest of promoting the welfare
of the child, the Malpica-Orsini majority maintained that the
consent "privilege" could not be extended to even a few putative
fathers, such as those who acknowledged paternity, since the "mere
possibility of a presently existing right on the part of even some
fathers . . . [was] enough to discourage a wide range of prospective
placements and adoptions. '3 2 Judge Cooke did not address the
question of what fundamental personal rights were involved,
stating only '33
that the reasons supporting the classification were
"compelling.
He denied that Stanley had any bearing on the equal
protection question before the court, maintaining that Stanley
required only that, as a matter of procedural due process, the
putative father be given notice and a hearing (not the right of
29

36 N.Y.2d at 572, 331 N.E.2d at 489, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 516.

The court offered two basic rationales for its conclusion that adoptions would be
reduced if the consent of the putative father were required. First, it suggested that putative
fathers were often difficult or impossible to locate, making their consent hard to obtain.
Second, the court reasoned that a paternal consent requirement would frighten off parents
and agencies potentially interested in adoption, since an absent putative father might reappear
at any time and challenge the validity of the adoption. Id. at 572-73, 331 N.E.2d at 489-90,
370 N.Y.S.2d at 516. Both rationales seem based on a presumption that the father could veto
the adoption at any time during his life. It seems more likely, however, that the consent
privilege would be waived if not exercised before the end of the adoption proceedings,
provided adequate notice were afforded.
30 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
31 Id. at 173. See text accompanying notes 81-85 infra.
32 36 N.Y.2d at 576, 331 N.E.2d at 492, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 519. See note 29 supra. Even if

the court were correct in presuming that existence of a consent privilege in the father would
discourage adoptions, the requirement of procedural due process for the father would
probably have the same effect in any event. To the extent that the putative father has a
"presently existing right" to notice and hearing, he can just as easily interfere with adoptions
without the consent privilege, if he so desires. See id. at 589, 331 N.E.2d at 500-01, 370
N.Y.S.2d at 531 (dissenting opinion, Jones, J.).
33 36 N.Y.2d at 577, 331 N.E.2d at 493, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 520.
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consent),3 4 and implied that the holding might not apply to
35
adoption cases in any event.
Judge Jones, in dissent, argued that Stanley stood for the broad
proposition that "a State may not terminate the relationship
between an unmarried father and his illegitimate child on any
ground other than one on which the relationship of a married
father with his legitimate child may be terminated."3 6 Maintaining
that the rights of a natural father with respect to his own child were
"fundamental,'

37

the dissent rejected the equal protection tests

used by the majority as inappropriate in this case. 38 Judge Jones
contended that when a "fundamental" right is involved, the state
must not only show that the interest served by the classification was
compelling, but also that the means employed were the least
restrictive possible to accomplish the statutory objective. 3 9 While
conceding that the state's interests in the welfare of illegitimate
children were sufficiently compelling to pass the first branch of the
strict scrutiny test, Judge Jones concluded that section 111 was
unconstitutional because it failed to pass the second brancl, in that
it needlessly restricted the rights of putative fathers who were
40
wholly suited to have custody of their children.
34 "In Stanley, the court found no basis for the classification which resulted in the
absence of notice and hearing to appellant. Orsini's rights were protected by the notice and
hearing." Id. at 577, 331 N.E.2d at 493, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 520. By concluding that Orsini had
received procedural due process in this case, the court did not have to reach the issue of
whether he was, in fact, entited to notice and hearing. This is still somewhat uncertain in New
York, since the Domestic Relations Law contains no provision for notice to putative fathers.
See note 24 supra.
35 That Judge Cooke might not consider Stanley applicable to adoption cases is
suggested by his reference to Stanley as "[that custody case." 36 N.Y.2d at 576, 331 N.E.2d at
492, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 519 (emphasis added). "Although this was an-adoption proceeding," he
later stated that the Stanley requirements of due process were met. Id. at 577, 331 N.E.2d at
492, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 520. Stanley "does not compel or even indicate a determination of
" Id. at 576, 331 N.E.2d at 492, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 519
unconstitutionality of section 111. ..
(emphasis added). This seems to be a questionable position in view of the two Supreme
Court remands subsequent to Stanley. See note 12 supra.
36 36 N.Y.2d at 579, 331 N.E.2d at 494, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 522.
37 36 N.Y.2d at 583-84, 331 N.E.2d at 496, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 525-27.
My conclusion that a natural father's rights and interest in his own child are
implicitly recognized and protected by the Constitution stems from my conception
of the basic civil rights of man-rights "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of
our people as to be ranked as fundamental" (Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97,
105) and which may be said to have been incorporated into the Constitution (cf.
Griswold v. Connecticut, ..

).

Id. at 584, 331 N.E.2d at 497, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 526-27 (dissenting opinion) (other citations
omitted).
38 36 N.Y.2d at 581-82, 331 N.E.2d at 495-96, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 524.
39 Id. See text accompanying notes 63-66 infra.
40 36 N.Y.2d at 585-86, 331 N.E.2d at 498, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 528-29.
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In a separate dissent, Judge Fuchsberg added sex discrimination as a reason for declaring section 111 unconstitutional. 41 While conceding that the Supreme Court's position on sex as
a "suspect" classification was "still in a state of ferment," Judge
Fuchsberg expressed the view that the court should find a stricter
protective constitutional standard for New York.4 2
II
THE EQUAL PROTECTION ISSUE

It is clear from the opinions in Malpica-Orsini that a
determination of the constitutionality of section 111 (or any similar
studies that suggest that adoption may not always be in the best
interests of the illegitimate child, that the presence of the natural
Although Judge Jones did not suggest any particular statutory alternative to § 111, he
did imply that notice and an opportunity to appear would have to be granted to the putative
father in every case. He also suggested that "the fact of unmarried fatherhood" might "have
to be established as a threshold prerequisite" for consent. Id. at 588, 331 N.E.2d at 500, 370
N.Y.S.2d at 531. One court has since cited this language as supportive of the proposition
that paternity should be established as a threshold prerequisite for providing notice and
hearing to the putaiive father. In re Fernando F., 373 N.Y.S.2d 755 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. of Bronx
Co. 1975). Judge Jones seemed quite dear, however, in maintaining that notice and opportunity to be heard would have to be granted "[i]n any event." 36 N.Y.2d at 589, 331 N.E.2d at
500, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 531.
41 The statute here results in a denial, without regard to the merits, of the natural right
of the father, not because the welfare of the child demands it, not because there is any
serious question but that he is a model father, but simply because he is the male rather
than the female parent.
Id. at 591, 331 N.E.2d at 502, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 533 (dissenting opinion).
For an analysis of how the proposed Equal Rights Amendment might affect the rights of
the putative father, see Comment, supra note 3, at 1609-11.
Several commentaries draw a comparison between the rights of the putative father in
adoption proceedings and in the decision by an unwed mother to have an abortion:
A helpful analogy can be drawn between the putative father's consensual
privilege in adoption of the illegitimate child and any consensual privilege that he
might assert in the abortion decision. The adoption process is one in which the legal
rights and obligations which exist between the child and his natural parents are
terminated. The analogy is relevant because in both the abortion and adoption
situations the mother seeks to terminate the parental interests in both herself and
the father.
6 ST. MARY's L. J. 407, 411 (1974). See also Sherain, Beyond Roe and Doe: The Rights of the
Father, 50 NOTRE DAmE LAW. 483, 486-95 (1975).
42 36 N.Y.2d -at 591, 331 N.E.2d at 502, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 533. Although the appellant
had argued that sex was a "suspect .class,"requiring application of the strict scrutiny test to §
111, the majority opinion did not even mention the point. In his dissent, Judge Jones found
the argument "relevant and interesting," but noted that only four Justices of the Supreme
Court had concluded that sex was a suspect class, citing Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677 (1973). 36 N.Y.2d at 583 n.5, 331 N.E.2d at 496 n.5, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 526 n.5.
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statute) depends upon which test of equal protection is applied.
Since the Stanley Court was not explicit as to the standard of equal
protection employed, courts have used a variety of formulations in
analyzing the constitutionality of statutes that affect the rights of
putative fathers. 4 3 The impact of Malpica-Orsini will thus depend
in large measure on the validity of its equal protection analysis as
measured against the various tests that could have been applied.
A. The Traditional "Rational Relation" Test
The traditional test of equal protection requires only that there
be a rational relationship between the statutory classification and a
legitimate state purpose. Under this test, the Supreme Court has
generally taken a very permissive view toward state laws, setting
aside classifications only if "no grounds can be conceived to justify
them. ' '44 The traditional test does not require that a statute
separate with mathematical precision those who are targets of the
45
statute's purpose from those who are not.
Almost any legislation can survive the rational relation test,
and section 111 is probably no exception. 4 6 Few would argue that
providing for the welfare of illegitimate children by facilitating
adoptions is not a legitimate state function. Moreover, it is possible
to conceive of several grounds that might justify the 'separate
classification of putative fathers in the name of protecting the
child's best interests.
The Malpica-Orsini majority provided several such "rationales"
for section 111 in its traditional equal protection analysis. The
court began with the presumption that adoption of illegitimate
children was generally desirable, and that by requiring consent of
the father such adoptions would often be impeded or blocked
altogether. 47 According to the court, couples and philanthropic
agencies would be dissuaded from adopting if a presently
unlocatable father could reappear at some future date and veto the
adoption.48 Moreover, the court suggested that putative fathers
might withhold their consent out of spite or a desire to "get back" at
the unwed mother. 4 9 Noting recent disclosures of the black market
43 See generally 9 GONZAGA L. REv. 826, 830 (1974); 39 Mo. L. REv. 573, 574 (1974).
44 McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969).
45 See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970); Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc.,
348 U.S. 483, 487-89 (1955).
46 See Comment, supra note 3, at 1587-88; 39 Mo. L. REv. 573, 575 (1974).
47 36 N.Y.2d at 572-73, 331 N.E.2d at 489-90, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 516-17. See notes 29 &
32 supra.
48 36 N.Y.2d at 572-73, 331 N.E.2d at 489-90, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 516-17.
49 Id.
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sales of children for adoption, the majority contended that unwed
fathers would use their consent power for extortion. 50 As an added
undesirable result, it was argued that marriages would be
discouraged, since a prospective husband would be reluctant to
marry an unwed mother without an assurance that he could
become the adoptive father.5
In addition to those cited by the court, there are other reasons
that have been offered to support the exclusion of putative fathers
from the adoption process. The mere fact that the mother is
present at birth provides a rationalization for requiring her
52
consent, since her connection with the child is firmly established.
There is also the traditional view that the unwed mother is usually
more concerned about her child's welfare than is the unwed father,
thus providing a more positive influence on the adoption
proceedings. 53 Moreover, it has been argued that by failing to
signify his devotion to the mother through a marriage ceremony,
the putative father "waives" the legally enforceable rights that
54
marriage bestows upon parents as a matter of -course.
A number of conceivable reasons might therefore be advanced
to support the enactment of section 111. Realistically, however, the
validity of the rationales outlined above is questionable, and
whether they have anything to do with the welfare of the
illegitimate child is doubtful. The Malpica-Orsinimajority provided
little in the way of statistical data or sociological research to support
its presumptions about the putative father.5 5 There are, in fact,
50 id.

Id.
5' See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 661 n.1 (1972) (dissenting opinion).
53 See note 5 supra.
5 This argument was employed by counsel for Illinois in Stanley, and noted by Chief
Justice Burger in his Stanley dissent:
[C]ounsel noted that in the case of a married couple to whom a legitimate child is
born, the two biological parents have already "signified their willingness to work
together" in caring for the child by entering into the marriage contract; it is
manifestly reasonable, therefore, that both of them be recognized as legal parents
with rights and responsibilities in connection with the child. There has been no
legally cognizable signification of such willingness on the part of unwed parents,
however, and "the male and female... may or may not be willing to work together
towards the common end of child rearing." To provide legal recognition to both of
them as "parents" would often be "to create two conflicting parties competing for
legal control of the child."
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 661 n.1 (1972) (dissenting opinion).
11 The court cited a 1961 study in Florida of 500 independent adoptions, which showed
that 16% of the couples who had direct contact with the natural parents reported subsequent
harassment, compared with only 2% of couples who had no contact. 36 N.Y.2d at 572-73,
331 N.E.2d at 489, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 516. Even if the 14% difference can be considered
significant, the study is only tenuously related to the potential impact of requiring the father's
51
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father can be very beneficial, 56 and that putative fathers are often
willing to marry the mother and contribute to the support of the
child. 57 Some sociologists also disagree with the notion that delays
in adoption necessarily cause serious harm to the child, arguing
that the "quality" of the adopting parents is a far more important
58
consideration.
There is no evidence that requiring the father's consent will
necessarily impede adoptions any more than requiring the
mother's consent.5 9 Suggestions that putative fathers would act out
consent to adoptions. There is no reason to suspect that requiring the father's consent would
necessarily involve more "direct contact" with the natural parents.
56 [I~t is hard to deny that a special affinity is usually created between a child and
the parent who helped conceive him. Though not all parents feel this affinity, and
even some who initially do may never reflect it in any meaningful relationship with
the child, the fact remains that it can be a very real and valuable thing. And it may
be an advantage for the child because it gives him a better chance for a healthy
parent-child relationship than he might otherwise have.
S. & E. KLiBANOFF, supra note 2, at 194-95.
A value for the child from both a psychological and a genetic point of view would
result from knowledge that his father, as well as his mother, participated in
responsible planning for his future and that information was available about his
paternal as well as his maternal background.
Dukette & Stevenson, supra note 5, at 7. "If the unmarried parents are given skilled social
service, the involvement of the father [in guardianship plans] may have benefit for the
mother." Id. at 8. "Many young couples are living together responsibly without being legally
married.... In this context, the transfer of children to unrelated families by their mothers
within a legal structure that excludes their fathers may be a less congenial pattern than in
earlier years." Id. at 14. Also, see M. GOLD, STATUS FORCES IN DELINQUENT Boys 123 (1963).
See generally J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD (1974).
"' Schlesinger, The UnmarriedFather, 21 CANADIAN HEALTH AND WELFARE 408 (1966),
cited in Juhasz, The Unmarried Adolescent Parent, 9 ADOLESCENCE 263, 268 (1974). Cf
Pannor, Evans & Massarik, The Unmarried Father: Findings and Implicationsfor Practice,
National Council on Illegitimacy, Bulletin NR-1, cited in Juhasz, supra. The Schlesinger study
found that "in many ways the unmarried father resembled the unmarried mother." Juliasz,
supra at 268.
58 It has long been thought that delay in adoptive placement is deleterious to the child,
either because it destroys the "continuity" of living with the same parents, or because it
requires some interim child-care arrangement that is generally damaging to the child's
development. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, supra note 56, at 31-34; S. & E.
KLIBANOFF, supra note 2, at 196; Dukette & Stevenson, supra note 5, at 7.
A recent study, however,- disagrees with this traditional view:
Continuity is not the sine qua non of the adjusted child or the happy
parent-child relationship. .'. . As the evidence clearly shows, it is the nature of the
relationship rather than its temporal duration that is important to the development
of attachment behaviors.
Mahoney & Mahoney, Psychoanalytic Guidelines for Child Placement, 19 SOCIAL WORK 688,
690-93 (1974). But see Points and Viewpoints, 20 SOCIAL WORK 154-55 (1975) (letters
commenting on the article by Mahoney & Mahoney, supra).
" The concern about discouraging adoptions seems somewhat inconsistent with the
present acute "shortage" of adoptable babies. See Friedman, Why are They Keeping Their*
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of vengeance, or that they would resort to extortion, are given no
empirical support by the court, and are based on the old stereotype
of the putative father as being somehow more "evil" than the
unwed mother. 60 Even if unwed mothers are generally more
concerned with the welfare of the child (which would be difficult to
prove), there is little logic in excluding all putative fathers from the
adoption proceeding simply because some are disinterested in the
outcome. Nor is there any reason to assume that a marriage by the
unwed mother to a man other than the putative father would
necessarily be discouraged by a requirement of paternal consent to
adoption or that such a marriage would necessarily be in the best
interests of the child. Finally, the suggestion that the consent
privilege is a legal right unavailable to those who do not marry
would justify denying the consent privilege to both unwed parents,
rather than just the father.
There is some support for the contention that requiring the
putative father's consent can sometimes complicate adoption
proceedings, where the putative father is difficult or impossible to
locate. 61 Such difficulties, however, are not inherent in a statutory
Babies?, 20 SOCIAL WORK 322 (1975). The shortage is due, in part, to the fact that young
unw'ed mothers are keeping their babies far more often today than they did a few years ago.
"Suprisingly, the father of the baby and the girl's family seem to have little to do with the
decision to keep the child. Whether they approve, assist, or agree does not make any
appreciable difference." Id.
In 1971 there were 169,000 adoptions in the United States, down from a total of
175,000 in 1970. This was the first decrease in the number of annual adoptions since 1952.
BUREAU OF CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 302 (1974). Illegitimate
births totaled 398,700 in 1970, of which 317,000 involved mothers between 15 and 24
years of age. Id. at 56. There were 8,056 adoption petitions granted in New York during
the period from July 1, 1973 to June 30, 1974. STATE OF NEw YORK, REPORT OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE BOARD OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE FOR THE JUDICIAL YEAR JULY 1, 1973
THROUGH JUNE 30, 1974, at 72-73 (1975). This represents the continuation of a steady

decline in the number of petitions granted, from a total of over 11,000 in 1970-71. See id.
(1971-74 volumes). However, the number of petitions withdrawn, denied, or dismissed has
remained fairly constant, at an average of about 180 per year over the last five years.
Illegitimates have consistently constituted a majority of the adoptees: 60% (or 4,837) of all
adoptees in New York in 1972-73, 56% in 1971-72, 72% in 1970-71, 73% in 1969-70, 72% in
1968-69. Id. (1971-75 volumes).
60 "The putative father, traditionally, has been viewed as 'the villian in the case,' 'the
sexual exploiter,' to be punished or ignored. However, research has revealed that in most
cases, these are erroneous conceptions." Juhasz, supra note 57, at 267.
This is not to say that acrimony, vengeance, or extortion are never motivating factors in
the withholding of consent of an adoption. The point is that either parent can engage in such
behavior. See S. & E. KLIBANOFF, supra note 2, at 195-96; Dukette & Stevenson, supra note 5,
at 10.
61 See S. & E. KLIBANOFF, supra note 2, at 196;'Brown & Brieland, Adoptive Screening:New
Data, New Dilemmas, 20 SOCIAL WORK 291 (1975); Dukette & Stevenson, supra note 5, at 7;
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scheme requiring consent, because the law can be drafted -to require
that the privilege to veto an adoption be exercised within
a
62
reasonable time after the filing of the adoption petition.
B.

Strict Scrutiny
Although section 111 might be able to stand under a
traditional rational relation test, it is clear from the above
discussion that it could not withstand a more rigorous examination.
Under the strict scrutiny test of equal protection, a classification
must not only serve a compelling state, interest, but must also
employ the least restrictive means available. 63 As pointed out in
Judge Jones's dissent, 64 section 1 11 has far too broad a sweep to
survive the latter test, since it denies the right of consent to all
putative fathers, while the welfare of the child could often be
protected by denying only some putative fathers the right of
65
consent.
The strict scrutiny test is applied only when the classification is
"suspect" or interferes with "fundamental" rights. 66 In the case of
Kadushin, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child: An Essay Review, 48 SOCIAL SERv. RFv. 508, 511
(1974). See also note 97 infra.
62 See the discussion of statutory alternatives in notes 86-101 and accompanying text
infra.
63 In contrast to the rational relation test, the strict scrutiny test does require that a
statute separate with mathematical precision those who are targets of the statute's purpose
from those who are not. See Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
64 In support of his analysis, Judge Jones cited Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972),
where the Court'held that a Tennessee durational residence law requiring a voter to have
been a resident one year in the state and three months in the county violated the equal
protection clause. Since there were adequate means of ascertaining bona fide residents on an
individual basis, the state could not conclusively presume nonresidence from failure to
satisfy the waiting period requirements of its durational residency liws. 36 N"Y.2d at
586-88, 331 N.E.2d at 498-99, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 528-30 (dissenting opinion). Judge Jones also
noted Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965), where the Court struck down a Texas statute
that denied the right to vote to all servicemen for the asserted purpose of restricting the
electorate to bona fide residents. 36 N.Y.2d at 586-87, 331 N.E.2d at 499, 370 N.Y.S.2d at
529. Also, see Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 654-58 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535,

542-43 (1971).
65 "It may be, as the State insists, that most unmarried fathers are unsuitable and
neglectful parents.... But all unmarried fathers are not in this category; some are wholly
suited to have custody of their children." Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,-654 (1972).
"6 See Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627-28 (1969). Some examples
of "suspect" classifications are race (McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191-94 (1964)),
national origin (Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954)), and alienage (In re Griffiths, 41a
U.S. 717 (1973)). Rights deemed by the Court to be "fundamental' are the right to vote
(Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627-28 (1969)), the right to travel
(Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)), and the right to procreate (Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)). For other cases, see Judge Jones's dissent, 36 N.Y.2d at
581 nn.2-3, 331 N.E.2d at 495 nn.2-3, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 524 nn.2-3.
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section 111, the classifications that might be considered suspect are
illegitimacy, since the distinction between the unwed father and all
other parents is based on the birth status of the child, and sex,
since the mother and father of the illegitimate child are treated
differently. The Supreme Court has expressly declined to pass on
the issue of whether illegitimacy is a suspect class. 67 And since a
majority of the Court has also refused to denominate sex as a
suspect class, 68 the application of the strict scrutiny test to section
111 depends (at least for now) on whether that statute interferes
with a fundamental right.
Certain language in the Stanley decision suggests that the
interest of a putative father in his children is, "fundamental." As
Justice White stated for the majority:
The private interest here, that of a man in the children he has
sired and raised, undeniably warrants deference and, absent a
powerful countervailing interest, protection ....
The rights to
conceive and to raise one's children have been deemed
"essential," . . "basic civil rights of man," . . and "rights far
69
more precious . . . than property rights."
67 Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 631-32 (1974). The appellants in Jimenez
petitioned the Court to strike down a provision of the Social Security Act that treated
illegitimates and legitimates differently for purposes of disability insurance benefits, on the
ground *that illegitimacy was a "suspect" class. The Court ruled that 'w]e need not reach
appellants' argument" that illegitimacy is a suspect class, because it was possible to strike
down the statute under the less rigorous test employed in Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
406 U.S. 164 (1972). In Weber, the Court had ruled that no legitimate state interest justified a
Louisiana statute under which an unacknowledged illegitimate child could n6 t recover under
workmen's compensation on the same basis as a legitimate child or an acknowledged
illegitimate child.
In Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971), a case decided shortly before Weber, the
Court seemed to indicate that illegitimacy was not a suspect class. In Labine, the Court
upheld a Louisiana statute that differed in its treatment of illegitimates and legitimates for
purposes of inheritance, noting that the "statute dearly has a rational basis in view of
Louisiana's interest in promoting family life and of directing the disposition of property left
within the State." Id. at 536 n.6.
Prior to Labine, the Court struck down statutes that denied wrongful-death benefits to
illegitimate children (Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968)), and that denied wrongful-death
benefits to the mother of illegitimate children (Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co.,
391 U.S. 73 (1968)). See Comment, supra note 3, at 1592-97. See also Andrews v. Drew
Municipal Separate School Dist., 371 F. Supp. 27 (N.D. Miss. 1973), aff'd, 507 F.2d 611 (5th
Cir.), cert. granted, 44 U.S,L.W. 3179 (No. 74-1318 Oct. 6, 1975) (striking down restrictions on
employment of unwed mothers as teachers).
'8 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). The Court has recently invalidated a
number of gender-based classifications, but without designating sex as a suspect class.
Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Reed
v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). But see Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975); Kahn v.
Shevin, 516 U.S. 351 (1974).
69 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (citations omitted).
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That the Stanley Court intended to classify the rights of the
father regarding his children as "fundamental" is supported by the
Court's subsequent decision in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld.70 In
Wiesenfeld, the Court cited Stanley in support of the proposition that
the right of a father to the companionship, care, custody, and
management of his children is a "constitutionally protected
right."' 71 In view of the Court's previous definition of "fundamental
rights" as those "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the
Constitution," 72 the decision in Wiesenfeld offers strong support to a
fundamental right of the putative father in the care and
companionship of his children.7 3 Nevertheless, in the absence of a
Supreme Court case that is explicit on the matter, courts may still
feel free to treat the rights of the putative father regarding his
children as something less than "fundamental."
C.

Other Approaches
1. A More Demanding Rational Relation Test

Even if the strict scrutiny test is not applicable to cases
involving putative fathers, there are other standards of equal
protection under which section 111 might be found constitutionally
invalid. In recent years, the Supreme Court has struck down a
number of statutes using a rational relation analysis, even though
the statutes did have conceivable rationalizations that probably
would have been sufficient for the purposes of the traditional test.
For example, the Court has invalidated as having no rational
relation to legitimate state interests statutes that give preference to
7(0420 U.S. 636 (1975).

Id. at 652. Wiesenfeld involved a provision of the Social Security Act under which
survivors' benefits based on the earnings of the father were paid to both the mother and
children, while benefits based on earnings of the mother were paid only to the children. The
Court struck down the provision, citing language from Stanley:
It is no less important for a child to be cared for by itssole surviving parent when
that parent is male rather than female. And a father, no less than a mother, has a
constitutionally protected right to the "companionship, care, custody, and
management" of "the children he has sired and raised.
Id, quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
712 San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33 (1973).
73 There are other fundamental rights that § I1Icould be said to violate. For example,
it could be argued that by denying the consent privilege to putative fathers, the state is
somehow interfering with their fundamental right to privacy, as outlined in Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Both Roe and
Griswold involved intra-family matters, suggesting that the privacy being protected is some
form of "family-unit privacy." Sherain, supra note 41, at 484.
See also 39 Mo. L. Ray. 573, 580-81 (1974), citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972), and Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
71
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men over women in the appointment of administrators of
decedents' estates, 74 that provide a different age of majority for
men and women,7 5 and that treat illegitimate children differently
than legitimate children in the distribution of disability insurance
benefits.7 6 In all of these cases there were "rational" reasons that
might have supported the classification under the traditional test's
presumption of reasonableness.7 7 That the Court evidently
demanded a higher degree of justification is evidence of a more
demanding approach, which gives greater consideration to
individual rights.
If examined under this more demanding test of
reasonableness, the classification of putative fathers under section
111 might not survive. It is far from clear that there is any
convincing basis for the statute's underlying presumptions about
the putative father's capabilities as a parent; it is at least equally
unclear whether adoption is always in the best interests of the
children.7 8 The statute seems vulnerable not only because of its
distinction between unwed fathers and all other fathers, but also on
the basis of its somewhat arbitrary distinction between unwed
mothers and unwed fathers. Recent decisions indicate that the
Court will not hesitate to strike down gender-based classifications
using a stricter rational relation approach.79 In Wiesenfeld, for
example, the Court invalidated a gender-based distinction in the
Social Security Act, while admitting that there was empirical evidence to support the classification. 80
2. The "Balancing" Test
Another method of equal protection analysis used in recent
years rejects the "two-tier" approach commonly used in the past, in
favor of a more "realistic examination of the conflicting policies
and interests [involved] in the challenged statute."'8 1 This approach,
74 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
's Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
7' Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974).
77 For example, in Reed, the Idaho Legislature concluded that, on the whole, men were
better qualified to administer estates than were women. Similarly, in Stanton, the statute was
based, in part, on a belief that women mature at an earlier age than men, and that men
require support from their parents for a longer period. Although these rationales seem
dubious, it is not inconceivable that they have some basis in fact.
78 See notes 55-60 and accompanying text supra.
7'9Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636
(1975); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
:0 420 U.S. at 651.
1 Comment, Illegitimacyand Equal Protection, 49 N.Y.U.L. REV. 479, 485-86 (1974), citing
Weber v. Aetna Gas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1972).
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which is one of the tests Judge Cooke purported to employ, 82
involves a weighing of the state interests promoted against the
fundamental rights endangered by the classification. Whether these
are the same "fundamental rights" required under the strict
scrutiny test, or are something less, it is evident from the language
of Stanleys 3 and Wiesenfeld 84 that the interest of the putative father
in his children would certainly deserve consideration if the
"balancing" test were applied to section 111. When weighed against
the possibility that a less restrictive statute could protect the state's
interests (for example, by requiring that a paternal veto be
exercised within a reasonable time), while at the same time
protecting the rights of the concerned putative father, the
provisions of section 111 could very well fail to pass the test.
The Malpica-Orsini majority seems to have misapplied the
balancing approach by ignoring the "fundamental rights" half of
the test. The court discussed only the state interests promoted by
section I li's classification, and never recognized any rights of the
putative father with which the classification might interfere.
Ironically, the very opinion cited by Judge Cooke as the model for
his analysis came down on the side of individual rights, by striking
down a statute that discriminated against illegitimates in the
awarding of workmen's compensation benefits. 85
III
STATUTORY ALTERNATIVES

A.

The Proposed Revision of Section 111
The importance of the Malpica-Orsini case lies mainly in its
potential influence on the reform of adoption consent laws that
state legislatures are considering in the wake of Stanley.8 6 This is
36 N.Y.2d at 574-75, 331 N.E.2d at 490-91, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 517-18.
83 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972). See text accompanying note 69 supra.
84 420 U.S. 636, 651-52 (1975). See notes 70-72 and accompanying text supra.
85 See Weber v. Aetna Gas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
86 At least five state legislatures are considering reform of adoption consent laws as of
this writing. Proposals in Wyoming and Kansas would require the consent of the putative
father in some cases. 1 FAM. L. REP. 2182, 2196 (Jan. 21 & 28, 1975). In Massachusetts,
House Bill No. 3875, 1975 Legislative Session, would entitle a putative father to notice of
any adoption proceeding involving his illegitimate children, provided he files a "Paternal
Responsibility Claim" at some time prior to the adoption proceedings. 1 FA. L. REP. 2591
(July 15, 1975). The Ohio House of Representatives has passed a comprehensive adoption
reform bill, which includes a requirement that all independent adoptions be made through
authorized adoption agencies. 1 FAM. L. REP. 2720-21 (Sept. 2, 1975). The proposed revision
82
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especially true in New York, where the legislature was already
considering a revision of section 111 when Malpica-Orsini was

decided. The proposal, drawn up by the New York State Law
Revision

Commission ("the Commission"), would require the

consent of a putative father "having lawful custody" of his
illegitimate child prior to an adoption. 87 Consent would not be
required from other putative fathers, although notice would be
provided any putative father whose paternity has been adjudged
88
or acknowledged.
in the New York adoption consent law is discussed in notes 87-94 and accompanying text
infra.
87 The Commission recommends the amendment of § 111 to read as follows:
Subject to the limitations hereinafter set forth consent to adoption shall be
required as follows:
1. Of the adoptive child, if over fourteen years of age, unless the judge
or surrogate in his discretion dispenses with such consent;
2. Of the parents or surviving parent, whether adult or infant, of a child born
in wedlock;
3. Of the mother, whether adult or infant, of a child born out of wedlock;
4. Of any person, including thefather of a child born out of wedlock, or authorized
agency having lawful custody of the adoptive child.
Report of the Law Revision Commission for 1975, in 1975 McKinney's Session Law News of
N.Y. A-126 (emphasis indicates new language) [hereinafter cited as N.Y. Law Revision
Comm'n Report].
It is unclear how the language added to subsection 4 (i.e., "including the father of a
child born out of wedlock") actually changes existing law. Section 111 already requires the
consent of any person with lawful custody, including, presumably, a putative father. The
addition suggested by the Commission would only be necessary if the father of an
illegitimate were not considered a "person" under present law: a distinction which is not, in
fact, made anywhere in the Domestic Relations Law.
88 Id. at A-126 to -127. Because § 111 presently makes no provision for notice, the
proposed notice provisions occupy an entirely new § 111-a:
If a father of a child born out of wedlock does not have lawful custody of such
child at the time adoption proceedings are instituted, his consent is not required;
but he must be given ten days' notice by certified mail at his last known address of
the examination before the judge or surrogate required by sections one hundred
twelve or one hundred fifteen of this title only if, prior to the institution of the
adoption proceeding, he has been adjudicated to be the child's father by a court of
competent jurisdiction or he has acknowledged the paternity of such child in open
court or by a verified written statement filed with the family court of any county of
the state of New York.
Id The bil facilitates the notice requirements of section 111-a through a minor amendment to § 543 of the Family Court Act, which presently provides a central registry system
for all paternity orders. The bill extends this registry system to include paternity
acknowledgements as well. The bill also amends § 384 of the Social Services Law to require
the signature of a natural father on an instrument surrendering an illegitimate child to an
authorized agency for adoption whenever the father has custody of the child. N.Y. Law
Revision Comm'n Report A-126 to -127. See note 26 supra, for provisions of the present law.
The proposed revision was passed in its entirety by the General Assembly on June 17,
1975 (A. Intro. No. 3956), and was pending before the Senate Judiciary Committee (S.
Intro. No. 2689) at the dose of the 1975 regular session. 1975 NEW YORK LEGISLATIVE
RECORD AND INDEX

A-374.
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In a memorandum supporting the proposed changes,

89

the

Commission states that the bill is needed to bring New York
adoption statutes into compliance with Stanley, which "held that
an unwed father with custody of his illegitimate child must be given
the same rights as all other parents in proceedings to involuntarily
terminate parental rights." 90 The Commission notes that many
adoption agencies in New York are making no attempt to interpret
or comply with Stanley's mandate, and expresses concern that
challenges to ostensibly finalized adoptions may result.9 1
When read in the context of the Commission's memorandum,
the proposed statutory revision appears as a very limited attempt to
comply with the minimum requirements of Stanley. The impetus
for the statute comes not so much from a concern for the rights of
the putative father, as from a desire to protect finalized adoptions
from subsequent litigation. 92 In interpreting Stanley, the
Commission apparently confined the impact of the case to its facts,
inferring that only the putative father with custody of his children is
constitutionally entitled to the same privileges as the unwed
mother. 93 The provisions in the proposed revision for notice to
89 Relating to the Rights of Fathers of Illegitimate Children in Adoption Proceedings, N.Y. Law
Revision Comm'n Report A-125 to -126.
90 Id. at A-125.
91 Many adoption agencies in New York are making no attempt to interpret or
comply with Stanley's mandate, but are simply fulfilling the present invalid statutory
requirements. Since an invalid consent results in an invalid adoption, this practice
could have tragic consequences. New York's statutory law should be revised to
provide unwed fathers with their constitutional rights, so that adoptive parents can
be assured of final, valid adoptions.
Id. at A-126.
92 This concern was also expressed by the Malpica-Orsini majority. 36 N.Y.2d at 573-74,
331 N.E.2d at 490, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 517. It should be noted, however, that this problem is
the result of uncertainty about the law after Stanley, and is not inherent in a statutory scheme
requiring consent. A "nonretroactive" clause could protect existing adoptions under a statute
enacted to require paternal consent. Moreover, in its remand of Rothstein v. Lutheran Soc.
Serv., 405 U.S. 1051 (1972) (see note 12 supra), the Supreme Court specifically allowed for
"due consideration for ... the fact that the child has apparently lived with the adoptive
family" for a considerable time.
93 In Stanley, the father had physical custody of his children, but not a legally
recognized right to that custody. By holding that the father had a right to notice and
hearing, the Court indicated that physical custody was sufficient to establish the father's
interest in the children, regardless of the legal status of that custody. The Commission
appears to have missed this distinction in requiring that a person have "lawful" custody
before his consent is required for an adoption. Moreover, the meaning of "lawful custody"
under New York law is uncertain. "Lawful custody" is defined in N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW
§ 109(6) (McKinney 1964) as "a custody (a) specifically authorized by statute or (b) pursuant to
judgment, decree or order of a court or (c) otherwise authorized by law." This provision has
been construed to include only natural or appointive guardians as "lawfur custodians. In re
Erhardt, 27 App. Div. 2d 836, 277 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1967). It is unclear, however, whether a
putative father can qualify as a "natural guardian" merely because he has physical custody of
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putative fathers who have acknowledged paternity can be seen as a
response to Stanley's emphasis on the right of the putative father to
procedural due process.
Under the more rigorous standards of equal protection, i.e.,
standards other than the traditional rational relation test, the
proposed New York law has serious shortcomings. The
requirement that a putative father have lawful custody of a child
before his consent to an adoption is required is essentially an
arbitrary distinction; whether or not the father has custody often
has little to do with his interest in the children, or in his ability to
be a good parent. Moreover, to the extent that custody is any
indication of a parent's interest in a child, the statute is inconsistent in requiring the consent of other parents whether or
not they have custody. Nor is the custody requirement necessary to
preclude delays in adoption proceedings that might be caused by
lengthy searches for absent putative fathers. Since the court must
take the time, in any event, to give notice and hearing to any
acknowledged putative father, no appreciable delay would be
added by requiring the consent of such a father who appears at the
proceedings.
Indeed, the proposed revision makes no changes in section
111 that would significantly alter the treatment of that statute
under the various equal protection tests discussed above. The law
would still treat putative fathers differently from all other parents,
it would still bear a questionable relation to the child's welfare, and
it would still treat men and women differently. Moreover, the
statute might create an additional equal protection problem, since
it treats putative fathers with custody of their children differently
than all other putative fathers.
Nevertheless, the New York Legislature should have no
constitutional qualms about the proposed legislation if it relies on
the Malpica-Orsiniopinion. Indeed, under Judge Cooke's analysis it
is not even constitutionally necessary to require (as does the
proposed revision) the consent of putative fathers who have
custody of their illegitimate children. The court's narrow reading
of Stanley suggests that only procedural due process, i.e., notice and
the child. Only in the unusual case where the unwed father has been appoiritdd legal
guardian of his child is it certain that he has "lawful custody." The Law Revision Commission
recognized this ambiguity (N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n Report A-125), but did nothing

to remedy it under the proposed revision. Under the "!new" § 111, the term "lawful custody"
is still used, and the definition of that term under § 109(6) of the Domestic Relations Law
remains the same. See generally 15 N.Y. JUR. Domestic Relations §§ 462-65 (1972); 25 N.Y.
JuRt. Guardian and Ward §§ 5-7 (1962).
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hearing, is required, and only for putative fathers who have
custody. 9 4 Thus, even the notice provisions of the Commission's
proposal may be broader than necessary under Malpica-Orsini,
since they extend procedural due process to any acknowledged
father.
In fact, if the legislature is so inclined, Malpica-Orsiniprovides
a rationalization for leaving section 111 completely unchanged. By
ruling that the consent of a putative father is never required for an
adoption, the court of appeals has removed the uncertainty that
prompted the Commission to recommend a revision in the first
place.
B.

Other Statutory Approaches
A major premise of Judge Cooke's equal protection analysis
was that there was no way to protect the state's interest in speedy
and permanent adoptions without denying the consent privilege to
all putative fathers. The variety of adoption law reform bills
enacted since Stanley tends to belie this conclusion. These new
statutes fall into three basic categories (although there may be
variations within each group), based primarily on how narrowly or
broadly they construe Stanley.
The first group includes statutes that do not require the
consent of any putative father to an adoption, and that require
95
notice only to those fathers who have acknowledged paternity.
Such statutes are obviously based on a very narrow reading of
Stanley-that unwed fathers are entitled only to procedural due
process, and then only if they have taken positive steps to show
"interest" in the child. Since this approach is basically the same as
that of section 111 (as presently written) insofar as consent is
concerned, the same equal protection arguments will apply as those
raised with respect to Malpica-Orsini.
A second type of statute takes a very broad view, requiring
notice to, and consent from, all biological fathers, acknowledged or
otherwise. 96 Under this approach, Stanley is interpreted as
mandating equal rights for the putative father, i.e., the same rights
as all other parents, in any proceeding involving his children. It is
likely that a statute following this view could survive any test of
94 See notes 34-35 supra.
95 See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 74 (1973); MD. RULES OF PROCEDURE D73, D74

(Supp. 1975). Cf REVISED UNIFORM ADOPTION ACT §§ 5, 6, 11.
91 See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.32.030 (Supp. 1974); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.84
(Supp. 1975).
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equal protection since it really makes no classifications at all. The
practical administration of such a statute might be quite
complicated, however, especially where the location, or even the
identity, of the putative father is unknown. Notice by publication
might be required in many cases, with the likelihood of
97
embarrassment and possible hardship to the parties involved.
Moreover, unless the statute contained some time limitation on the
exercise of the consent privilege, the requirements could lead to
delay in adoption proceedings or disruption of completed
adoptions.
Statutes that attempt to deal with such practical problems,
while still protecting some of the putative father's rights, fall into a
third group. 98 The idea underlying such statutes is that Stanley
97 The problems attendant to providing notice to unknown putative fathers have
prompted the most widespread objection to the Stanley decision. Professor Barron of the
George Washington University Law School argues that in the vast majority of cases the
identity and location of the father are unknown, and that notice by publication is usually
futile. Requiring procedural due process in every case therefore has the effect of holding up
adoptions for long periods of time. In addition, Professor Barron maintains that requiring
the mother to identify the father is a very severe invasion of her privacy. Adoption, Adoptees'
Rights Debated at ABAMeeting, I FAM. L. REP. 2736, 2737-38 (1975). See also Barron, Notice to
the Unwed Fatherand Termination of ParentalRights: Implementing Stanley v. Illinois, 9 FAM. L.Q.
527 (1975). To date, however, there is little statistical evidence as to the effect of the notice
requirement on the speed of the adoption process.
Recently, the Supreme Court heard argument on the constitutionality of a Connecticut
Statute (CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 52-440b (1975)) that required the mother of an illegitimate
child to divulge to designated officials the name of the putative father of the child.
Noncompliance with the statute was a contempt punishable by imprisonment up to one year
and a fine of up to $200. The statute applied to mothers of illegitimate children receiving
Aid to Families with Dependent, Children. The appellants argued that the statute resulted in
a denial of due process and equal protection, and also that its application caused an
impermissible invasion of privacy. The Supreme Court, without reaching the constitutional
questions involved, remanded the case in light of recently enacted amendments to the Social
Security Act, which require that unwed mothers cooperate with the state in finding the
father as a condition of eligibility for aid. Roe v. Norton, 422 U.S. 391 (1975).
98 See, e.g., Mica. STAT. ANN. §§ 27.3178 (555.28)-(555.43) (1975 Current Material
Release #1); ch. 640, [1975] Oregon Laws 123 (pamph. 8).
The Michigan statute requires the consent of the father if he has filed a notice of
intent to claim paternity prior to the birth of the child. If no declaration of paternity has
been filed, the court must determine whether the father was ever notified of the child's birth,
and whether the father has provided support for the child, or whether the parents have
married subsequent to the birth of the child. If the court finds one of these situations to
exist, then efforts must be made to notify the father.
The Oregon statute is similar to Michigan's, but establishes different criteria for
providing notice to unacknowledged putative fathers. Notice is provided by personal service
and, if necessary, by publication if the putative father has contributed to or attempted to
contribute to the support of the child during the year immediately preceding the initiation
of an adoption proceeding, or if the child has resided with the putative father during the 60
days immediately preceding the initiation of an adoption proceeding. If a father responds to
such notice, his consent to the adoption may still be required, upon a determination of his
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requires the abolition of only those classifications of putative
fathers that are not essential to compelling state interests. Under
this approach, the consent of the putative father is required for
adoption, but only if the father has taken some positive step to
show his interest in the child; for example, by acknowledging
paternity, providing support, or visiting the child frequently. This
could very well be acceptable under a "demanding" rational
relation test, since it protects the rights of most putative fathers
who are truly concerned with the welfare of their illegitimate
children.
If the father's interest in his children is deemed to be
"fundamental," however, the strict scrutiny test would be applied,
and the state would have to explain why certain putative fathers
were denied the same consent privilege given to other parents. It
might be very difficult to produce convincing evidence that a father
was presumably unfit merely because he had not taken the
particular "positive step" required by the statute. To be sure, the
state.might argue that a less restrictive classification would impose
notice requirements so burdensome as to seriously endanger the
welfare of the child by delaying adoption and/or cause an
impermissible invasion of the mother's privacy if notice by
publication were required.9 9 However, there is probably
insufficient evidence to justify such a sweeping conclusion at the
present time. Although social workers and adoption agencies are
complaining about difficulties created by the Stanley decision, it is
unclear whether the problems derive from the notice requirements
per se, or simply from uncertainty about the nature of those
requirements.
Whether or not a state is willing to undertake the measures
required by the strict scrutiny test, it is clear that the rights of the
putative father can be protected to some degree without seriously
impeding orderly adoptions. Requiring notice to, and consent
from, all acknowledged putative fathers whose whereabouts are
known would seem to be a minimal step which can easily be taken.
Moreover, there is no reason that a judge cannot at least make
inquiries at adoption proceedings to determine if the identity and
location of the unwed father is ascertainable. 00 The judge might
fitness by the judge. Failure of the father to appear, however, frees the court to act in his
absence and without his consent.
99 See note 97 supra.
L00 The Illinois statute states that the court may direct notice to the father upon petition
from any interested party in the proceedings. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-12a (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1975).
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be given the power to require the consent of an unacknowledged
father, where he determines that such father may still be found
and brought into the proceedings. Finally, to the extent that courts
are allowed to dispense with the consent of an unwed father, they
should also be allowed to dispense with the mother's consent for
the same reasons. 101 Thus, if the statute requires the father to
demonstrate his interest in the child in some way before his consent
is required, the same demonstration of interest should be required
of the mother. Indeed, a statute that set the same prerequisites for
both the mother's and the father's consent would be relatively free
of potentially offensive classifications and might be able to survive
even the strict scrutiny test.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's opinion in Stanley has brought into
doubt the constitutionality of many state statutory provisions that
The California adoption statute seems to take this approach, at least to a degree.
The statute provides several factors under which the court can dispense with the consent of
either parent. ch. 1244, § 244, [1975] West's Cal. Legis. Serv. 3440.
One court has suggested that a judge should be allowed to waive the consent of either
parent where the child's best interests Would thereby be served. In re Commitment of
.Tyease "J", 373 N.Y.S.2d 447 (Surr. Ct. of New York Co. 1975). This would, in effect,
equate "downward" the rights of the unwed father and mother- by making those rights
secondary to the child's welfare. Under § 111, as presently constituted, the mother can veto
an adoption even when the adoption is clearly in the child's best interests, as long as her veto
power is not waived under one of the specific statutory exceptions (e.g., abandoment,
insanity, and drunkenness). See note 26 supra. New York law does recognize the child's best"
interests (as determined by the court) as the sole consideration when a parent attempts to
revoke a previous surrender instrument or adoption consent. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW
§ 115-b(3) (McKinney Supp. 1975); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 385(5) (McKinney Supp. 1975).
Moreover, a judge can act to protect the child's best interests in some cases by exercising his
discretionary power under § 111 to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard to
genuinely concerned parents whose consent may not be required for some reason. It seems
unlikely, however, that New York courts will adopt a broad "best-interests-of-the-child"
standard for all adoption cases in the absence of further action by the legislature. Far from
favoring a flexible scheme in which a judge can order or block an adoption clearly in the
child's interest, the Malpica-Orsinimajority strongly endorsed the rigid presumptions of the
present law under which a maternal veto power is always considered consistent with the
child's best interests.
The Illinois adoption law contains a provision that makes the best interests and welfare
of the person to be adopted of "paramount consideration" in the construction and
interpretation of the Act. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-20a (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1975). This
provision, along with several provisions of the Illinois adoption law, has been used to justify
judicial waiver of the consent requirement where adoption is dearly in the child's best
interests. See Stines v. Vaughn, 23 Ill. App. 3d 511, 516-17, 319 N.E.2d 561, 564-65 (1974).
The Ohio Supreme Court has given a similar interpretation to that state's adoption law. State
ex rel, Portage County Welfare Dep't v. Summers, 38 Ohio St. 2d 144, 311 N.E.2d 6 (1974).
See also 60 VA. L. REv. 718 (1974) (discussing Virginia statute that allows court to waive
consent requirement when child's best interests will be served).
101
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treat putative fathers differently, than other parents, .The most
immediate effect of the Malpica-Orsini decision should be to foreclose any such doubts as to the putative father's right to veto a New
York adoption of his illegitimate child. By ruling that the putative
father's consent is never required for an adoption, the court of
appeals has effectively precluded the possibility that a putative
father might successfuly challenge a finalized New. York adoption
on equal protection grounds. Malpica-Orsini does not, however,
clarify the nature and extent of the putative father's right to notice
and hearing under New York law. Since section 111 does not
require notice to a putative father, it still might be possible for him
to challenge an adoption on due process grounds, if he was never
granted notice and an opportunity to be heard in the adoption
proceeding.
To the extent that Malpica-Orsiniis followed in other states, it
could very well have the effect of slowing the reform of adoption
consent statutes prompted by the Stanley decision. Judge Cooke's
opinion provides a ready analysis, purportedly consistent with
Stanley, which denies that state adoption laws' requiring only the
consent of the unwed mother are in any way violative of the
Constitution. The decided lack of interest in the rights of putative
fathers prior to Stanley suggests that legislatures are not particularly
interested in the problem, and many may be relieved to discover a
rationale under which statutory change is not required..On the other hand, it is likely that some courts and legislatures
will be dissatisfied with the equal protection analysis used by the
Malpica-Orsinicourt and with the result it reached. Stanley brought
increased attention not only to constitutional questions about the
rights of putative fathers, but also to human interests that have
often been ignored under past practices. A greater awareness of the
concern that many putative fathers hold for the welfare of their
children could lead to modification of adoption consent laws that
presently presume that all unwed fathers are unfit parents. To that
end, reasonable measures are available to protect the rights and
interests of the putative father, without compromising the state's
concern for the best interests of the illegitimate child.
David S. Baron

